

## **Zhuangzi, Mysticism, and the Subject**

James Hibbard, DePaul University

In the Introduction to his recent translation of the “Inner, Outer and Miscellaneous Chapters”<sup>1</sup> of Zhuangzi,<sup>2</sup> Brook Ziporyn concisely elaborates the Western philosophical positions that can all viably be drawn out from the Inner Chapters of Zhuangzi. Noting the diversity of opinion, as well as the textual support present for this multiplicity of understanding, Ziporyn says:

There has been considerable diversity of opinion in understanding Zhuangzi as a philosopher, somewhat exacerbated by recent attempts by Western readers to fit him into a familiar Occidental philosophical category. Is Zhuangzi as represented in the Inner Chapters, a mystic? A Skeptic? A metaphysical monist? A spirit-body dualist? An intuitionist? A theist? An agnostic? A relativist? A fatalist? A nihilist? A linguistic philosopher? An existentialist? Or perhaps a poet uncommitted to any particular philosophical position? All of these have been suggested and aggressively argued for, and indeed none of these interpretations is without support in the text.<sup>3</sup>

As Western academic philosophers have sought to grasp and metabolize the writings attributed to Zhuangzi, many have sought to render the thinking of the Inner Chapters cohesive, and to subsume it under a “familiar Occidental philosophical category.” The Western philosophical Zhuangzi literature of the last two decades certainly supports Ziporyn’s claim for the diversity of Zhuangzi interpretation. In fact, much of the philosophical literature produced in recent years is so competent and well-argued that one must wonder if there is a larger problem latent in any attempt at the systematic philosophical subsumption of the writing attributed to Zhuangzi.

The sheer multiplicity of attempts to seek this sort of intelligibility and internal consistency point to the possibility that “philosophy” itself is a culturally specific enterprise and that this enterprise is constituted through particular linguistic practices and

informed by intellectual demands that make the cohesive incorporation of foreign traditions into Western patterns of thought and modes of argumentation exceptionally dangerous. The temptation for any Western reader who is familiar with the European philosophical tradition is to attempt to understand a text developed outside of that tradition by reducing it to any number of (though certainly not limited to) the categories enumerated above by Ziporyn. Although any movement to subsume and render a text cohesive under the imposed category is a dangerous one, it is also necessary in order to render the “foreign” text such that a Western reader can even begin to comprehend it.

However, this desire to subsume the writings attributed to Zhuangzi under Western philosophical conceptual frameworks is even more fraught with danger than the metabolizing of many other texts that originate from outside of the Western tradition, for the Inner, Outer, and Miscellaneous Chapters are in content and style created to explicitly deny the possibility of systemization and subsumption in general.

The project of reducing the writings of Zhuangzi to a particular Western conceptual category or understanding is thus always a violent one. This process of assimilation necessarily imports biases of thought and demands for internal coherence that were not simply not regarded by Zhuangzi, (as if these demands existed a priori but were not recognized by Zhuangzi) but were in fact likely not even intelligible to the creators of the text.

Central to the understanding of many Western commentators has been Zhuangzi’s relationship to human knowledge and how he conceives of both the reliability and the very possibility of knowledge. In his essay titled “Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ Chapter of the *Zhuangzi*,” Harold D. Roth references two of the most critically

important collections of essays on Zhuangzi: Victor Mair's *Experimental Essays on the Chuang Tzu* and Paul Kjellberg and P.J. Ivanhoe's *Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuangzi*. Roth makes clear that although these critical works are topically diverse, informing both of them is a fundamental concern for knowledge, and a lack of regard for the "mystical experience." As Roth says of these volumes:

Among the significant issues raised therein are those of whether the author, Zhuangzi, expresses a viewpoint that can be identified as "skeptical" or "relativist," and the authors answer in a variety of interesting and sophisticated ways. However, with certain exceptions that I will indicate below, most of the authors included in these volumes either deny, neglect, or, at best, only point to the mystical dimension of the text.<sup>4</sup>

Following Roth's basic emphasis on the mystical elements in Zhuangzi (though not engaging some of his distinctions), I will argue for an understanding of Zhuangzi that is in a carefully de-limited and immanent sense "mystical," without being in any way transcendent. In contradistinction to a conception of mysticism that has a metaphysical object (and thus establishes a new meta-position) I will argue for a mysticism that is not transcendent, but instead involves a radical dissolution of self as a fully constituted agent. Zhuangzi dissolves the "self" into a field of unity through a series of linguistic encounters that performatively demonstrate the limits of the individual judging ego. These encounters serve to demonstrate the perspectival nature of all linguistic and conceptual assertions that are formed by a fully constituted "I," and serve to "fix" subject-object binaries, and all distinctions of "this" (*shi* 是) and "that" (*bi* 彼) that follow from the position of a fully constituted "I." Zhuangzi suggests that the fully constituted "I," the "formed heart," is one that does not simply "mirror" the change, flux and alteration of the

world, but instead persists in the painful clinging to concepts that are necessarily subject to change and alteration.<sup>5</sup> As Zhuangzi says in Chapter 2:

If you regard what you have received as fully formed once and for all, unable to forget it, all the time it survives is just a vigil spent waiting for its end. In the process, you grind and lacerate yourself against all things around you.<sup>6</sup>

I will also argue that latent in Western philosophical demands for internal cohesion are standards of logical rigor that the works attributed to Zhuangzi are explicitly and carefully crafted to resist. The “success” of Zhuangzi is validated by the numerous and argumentatively elegant Zhuangzi commentaries and treatments that have sought to render Zhuangzi internally coherent and by Western philosophical standards “intelligible.” It is just these sorts of demands for coherence and intelligibility (for fixity of judgment) that Zhuangzi is inveighing against, and at numerous points in the text explicitly resists. As is stated in Chapter 2:

So no thing is not right, no thing is not acceptable. For whatever we may define as a beam as opposed to a pillar, as a leper as opposed to the great beauty Xishi, or whatever might be [from some perspective] strange, grotesque, uncanny, or deceptive, there is some course that opens them to form a oneness. Whenever fragmentation is going on, formation completion [*cheng*] is also going on. Whenever formation is going on, destruction is also going on.<sup>7</sup>

By Western philosophical standards of success, the most “successful” commentary of the writing attributed to Zhuangzi is thus by Zhuangzi’s standard the greatest failure, for any such commentary has been crafted to render the text as comprehensible and cohesive as “this” rather than “that”—explicitly the sort of conceptual inflexibility that Zhuangzi wishes to undermine. The commentator thus faces exactly the same difficulty faced by Zhuangzi himself, namely to use language in a fashion so as to articulate a mode of living

(for there is, indeed, something to convey) while carefully avoiding the temptation to turn that something into a meta-position. As Zhuangzi says in Chapter 2:

Making a point to show that a point is not a point is not as good as making a nonpoint to show that a point is not a point. Using a horse to show that a horse is not a horse is not as good as using a nonhorse to show that a horse is not a horse.<sup>8</sup>

Central to Zhuangzi's thinking is the perspectival nature of all language and judgments. As Zhuangzi says in Chapter 2, "Only as I know things myself do I know them."<sup>9</sup> For Zhuangzi, all fixed judgments are informed by the particular perspective of the individual. The very possibility of one being "ultimately right" presupposes a position from which one can take a position that has no perspective, a neutral perspective, which for Zhuangzi is a patent impossibility. The discussion near the end of Chapter 2 clarifies the particular tone of Zhuangzi's located and perspectival understanding of language and knowledge:

Once you and I have started arguing, if you win and I lose, then are you really right and am I really wrong? If I win and you lose, then am I really right and are you really wrong? Is one of us right and the other wrong? Or are both of us right and both of us wrong?... Whom shall we get to set us right?<sup>10</sup>

With the radically perspectival nature of any linguistic assertion, what can be said of Zhuangzi's discussions of "Big Knowledge," the "Way," "Heaven's Light," and other paths that lead one to see the unity of all that is? Does Zhuangzi in fact establish simply another meta-perspective, that of singularity or the "oneness of all that is?" I do not believe that he does. The key to avoiding the contradiction that would result from a "meta-perspective" is an evaluation of those elements of the text that encourage a "mirror-like" flexibility of judgment. "Mysticism" so understood thus relates not to a transcendental mystical escape, but rather an immanent mystical loss of a fully

constituted self. This is a loss by which one does not escape from the world, but is and always remains present. When one's identity is less fully determined, their modes of judging are necessarily always flexible and descriptive, rather than prescriptive and rigid. To reflexively be in the possession of a rigid and "fully formed heart," a fully-constituted self, always implies a rigidity in one's mode of being, and pre-figures the possibilities of how "this self," as constituted agent, can encounter the object.

What would it mean to claim that Zhuangzi's approach is mystical, in this sense of the mystical being understood as a complete flexibility of interpretation? And under what circumstances would a mystical understanding of Zhuangzi serve to aid one's comprehension of the text without reducing it to a particular Western philosophical position? I believe that much of the discomfort that Western-trained philosophers tend to have towards mystical conceptions of Zhuangzi is the result of equating the mystical with the transcendent, or at least with a sort of privileged perspective from "both everywhere and nowhere." However, to still have a "perspective" at all necessarily implies a subject in too strong a sense. Once mysticism is understood as an ability to be so radically receptive to the world that one's heart/mind (*xin* 心) is no longer fully formed, but is instead "empty" as the mirror is "empty," it becomes clear that mysticism is not a unity of a self with another transcendent other, but rather a recognition that the reflexive self that regards itself as a subject with a unique relationship to a world of objects is a fiction encouraged by certain modes of thought and language. Beyond the temptation to conflate "mysticism" with transcendence, "mysticism" is often equated with a simple lack of rigor and this all too frequent misunderstanding betrays a lack of recognition of the sophisticated fashion in which Zhuangzi employs language to "mystical ends." Zhuangzi

employs language to encourage a radical dissolution of the self as a self-reflective agent of action, an agent that is able to impose abstract thought on that which is “other,” that from which they are “distinct” and which is understood as “other” or “object.” I will argue that it is precisely Zhuangzi’s exceptionally mindful and sophisticated employment of language that allows him to use language in order to become self critical while avoiding the obvious difficulty of turning language and thought into a tool to demarcate its own limits.

Although he has certainly become more tempered in his view in recent years, Chad Hansen’s view in the early 1980’s was that the “interpretation of Zhuangzi is a philosophical scandal.”<sup>11</sup> Hansen claimed this on the grounds that Zhuangzi had hitherto (up until the philological and historical work of A.C. Graham) been understood by Western, mystically-minded “traditionalists” and “sinologists to echo religious themes,”<sup>12</sup> and that this understanding came at the expense of Western philosophical understanding of Zhuangzi the “skeptic” or Zhuangzi the “relativist”—terms with more philosophical purchase, but less mystical cachet. Hansen goes on in his 2003 essay “Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the Zhuangzi” to argue how Zhuangzi the “skeptic” and Zhuangzi the “guru” are not mutually exclusive and attempts to articulate how a “... Zhuangzi can emerge that can still satisfy our nostalgic urge to find ‘guiding wisdom.’”<sup>13</sup> Hansen’s attempt at “reconciliation” still seems excessively dismissive of not just oversimplified mystical interpretations of Zhuangzi, but of any mystical interpretation whatsoever which he refers to rather derisively as simply a “nostalgic urge.”

Following Hansen, I agree that Zhuangzi the “linguistic philosopher” and Zhuangzi the “mystical guru” are not mutually exclusive. However, I find great fault with

Hansen's seemingly dismissive treatment of "mysticism." Further, each of these "Zhuangzis," so often analytically distinguished, in fact imply and even demand one another. Although I clearly express reservations about comparing the work of Zhuangzi to Western thinkers, intelligibility on this point will be aided by looking to Ludwig Wittgenstein, clearly a "linguistic philosopher" by most accounts, who famously concludes the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* with the following, rather "mystical" statement:

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as non-sensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. [6. 54]

What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.<sup>14</sup> [7]

And from Chapter 26 in the *Zhuangzi*:

A trap is for fish: when you've got the fish, you can forget the trap. A snare is for rabbits; when you've got the rabbit, you can forget the snare. Words are for meaning: when you've got the meaning, you can forget the words. Where can I find someone who's forgotten the words so I can have a word with him?<sup>15</sup>

In Zhuangzi, as in Wittgenstein, some of the strongest mystical modes result from logical and linguistic engagement that performatively demonstrates the limiting aspects of language and conceptual thought. Thus forcing or even privileging either "linguistic" or "mystical" aspects of the text becomes much like the privileging of "this" over "that" or "self" over "other." The unity of the "mystical" and "linguistic philosophical" is always implicitly demanded and only forgotten through beliefs of ultimate "right" and "wrong," beliefs which are generated from particular subjective positions in reality and necessarily imply and in fact demand one another.

If one were to relativize all positions as perspectival, it follows that a mystical position that privileges the meta-perspective that “all things are one” would either present an inherent contradiction or reduce much of Zhuangzi’s language to a mere rhetorical device in order to prepare the soil for the new meta-position that “all things are one.” However, both of these tensions are resolved if one takes into account the radical dissolution of the fully constituted judging self that is suggested at various points in the text. Of the “I” Zhuangzi says:

We say “I,” but how do I know what I mean by ‘I?’ You dream you are a bird crossing Heaven or a fish sunk in the depths. There’s no telling if the one who speaks now is awake or dreaming. Directing the trip doesn’t measure up to smiling, and laughing doesn’t measure up to stepping aside. Step aside and leave the changes. Then you will enter the openness of the vacant sky.<sup>16</sup> (Chapter 6)

When the thinking subject, the individual ego, is understood not as distinct, but rather as relational and reciprocally implied by all that it is not, the pursuit of inter-subjective judgments from a necessarily located position comes to be seen as an obvious impossibility. Throughout the text there are numerous examples of opposites implying one another. One of the most illustrative is to be found in the second chapter:

Hence it is said, “Bi 彼”, ‘that’ comes from “Shi 是,” ‘this’ and follows from that.” This is the doctrine of the parallel birth of “this” and “that.” Even so, born together they die together. Dying together they are born together. If they are both okay, they are both not okay, If they are both not okay, they are both okay. If they are right in a way, they are wrong in a way. If they are wrong in a way, they are right in a way. For this reason the sage does not follow this route but illuminates things with Heaven’s light.<sup>17</sup>

Most fundamental is the fact that not only do all binary pairs imply one another, but the most basic of all binary pairs, the subject/object dichotomy (upon which all other judgments are predicated), can also be seen to dissolve into the unity of that which comes to be reflected through mystical praxis. This dissolution of the self as an individual

judging agent thus delimits all judging and abstract thinking that seeks ultimate grounding. The self does not dissolve into a transcendental god or into a realm of pure Being, but instead ceases to differentiate self as an individual active agent fully constituted as a distinct and active entity. The mind ceases to divide reality, and instead is like a mirror, receptive and open to the world of change and becoming. In the last of the “Inner Chapters,” Zhuangzi says:

Take everything you get from Heaven but don’t consider it a gain. Just be empty. Perfected people use their minds like mirrors, not welcoming as they come or escorting them as they go, they respond without keeping, so they can conquer without harm.<sup>18</sup> (Chapter 7)

A potential difficulty of an interpretation that is mystical without being transcendent, or offering a regressive meta-perspective is the frequent references to varying levels of *zhi* 知 which is translated by Ziporyn variously as “understanding,” “understanding consciousness,” “knowing consciousness,” “consciousness knowing,” “knowledge,” “cleverness,” or “wisdom,” and which is translated most frequently by Kjellberg simply as “knowledge,” and most often by A.C. Graham as “wit.”

A contrast between different gradations of *zhi* first appears in Chapter 1, and is translated by Kjellberg as: “Little knowledge does not measure up to big knowledge.”<sup>19</sup> This same line is translated by Ziporyn as: “A small consciousness cannot keep up with a vast consciousness....”<sup>20</sup> These varying translations of *zhi* are problematic, because to the Western reader “knowledge” has a very different connotation than does “consciousness.” Whereas “knowledge” implies something like a truth claim of correspondence between the mind of the subject and an aspect of a fixed “knowable reality,” consciousness does not. Additionally, the more consistent rendering of *zhi* as “knowledge” by Kjellberg

seems to present problems of intertextual reconciliation and correspondence that are not presented by the contextually informed various renderings by Ziporyn. This distinction between various contextually specific types of *zhi* appears again in Chapter 2. It is rendered in verse by Kjellberg and reads:

Big knowledge is boundless,  
Little knowledge is unbound.<sup>21</sup>

Rendered in prose form by Ziporyn, this section reads: “A large consciousness is idle and spacey; a small consciousness is cramped and circumspect.”<sup>22</sup> With the varied and contextually sensitive translations of *zhi*, by Ziporyn, many of the tensions that would seem to result from the juxtaposition of “big” and “little” knowledge are mitigated, for “consciousness” does not imply the sort of ultimate truth and correspondence that knowledge does for the Western reader. Concerns over the status of various gradations of “wit,” as it is translated by Graham, are likewise not as problematic as would be gradations of “knowledge.” Moreover, following my interpretation of the mystical as a loss of self that applies prefixed categories of understanding to the world, Ziporyn’s rendering of *zhi* as consciousness aids in an understanding of *zhi* that would not equate it with privileged understanding or perspective. However, some of the concerns over the privileging of one perspective over another still remain. Within the framework of the mystical, but not transcendent dissolution of the self, are the contrasting types of *zhi* simply two located perspectives, or is “big *zhi*” privileged as the state where one has seen through all distinctions, including the distinction between the self and the other?

Once “big *zhi*” (translated as “knowledge,” one of Ziporyn’s variants of “consciousness,” or Graham’s “wit”) is understood not as a meta-perspective, but rather either as a dissolution of self, or simply as another perspective (as would be implied by

many of the perspectival animal analogies throughout the text), the concern over the apparent privileging of “Big Knowledge” in the cited examples is relegated to a position of insignificance. In neither one of these potential understandings does one end up with the concerning contradiction that would result from a fully constituted self being in possession of superior knowledge. “Big *zhi*” could simply be another perspective that, though different, is in no way superior to “little *zhi*,” or it could be knowledge informed by a dissolution of the self. In either case, “big *zhi*” in no way offers anything like the privileged knowledge of fixed and ultimate truth that in the West from Plato onward has been the ideal (idealized) form of knowledge available to a certain fully constituted self-regarding agent. When rendered as “consciousness,” “big *zhi*” does not connote the possibility of anything like the Western idea of a “God’s eye view,” but rather implies a less determined, complete flexibility of self and a more fluid consciousness that clings to neither fixed conceptual categories, nor to a fixed concept of the individual as the self-same grounds upon which those categories are constituted.

In Zhuangzi, the transcendence of the self that is facilitated by recognizing the limits of linguistically constituted knowledge will result in a unification of subject and object. This recognition of unity through an appreciation of the limits of language and conceptual thought will extinguish desires to draw conceptual distinctions that seek ultimate grounding and fixed validity. Underlying and motivating conceptual argumentation that seeks fixed knowledge is the belief that there is a secure place, separate from the world from which to make accurate argumentative assertions. One who follows the Way, and cultivates an “emptiness of the mind” that no longer privileges any particular position as ultimately preferable, comprehends the fundamental unity of all that

is. As Zhuangzi says in Chapter 2, “Now I will try some words here about ‘this.’ But I don’t know if it belongs in the same category as ‘this’ or not. For belonging in a category and not belonging in that category themselves form a single category! Being similar is so similar to being dissimilar! So there is finally no way to keep it different than ‘that.’”<sup>23</sup>

Through the cultivation of a “mirror-like emptiness of the mind,” the sage ceases to regard “this and that” as distinct aspects of reality, but rather as necessarily implying one another. Just as day demands its “opposite,” night, in order to be constituted and understood as anything whatsoever, so does life demand and in fact imply death. The subject can never set himself as distinct from the world of objects, for he grows from the world and is always part of it. As Zhuangzi says in Chapter 2: “Without an Other there is no Self, without Self no choosing one thing rather than another.”<sup>24</sup> By Western, Cartesian, standards of what constitutes the “thinking self,” a self as the locus for judgment, the ideal “self” as described by Zhuangzi is so weak that it fails to even rise to the standard of the traditional Western understanding of the term. For Zhuangzi, one who has seen the fundamental unity of all that is has ceased to act under the fiction of the possibility of a distinct judging agent in possession of conceptual categories. A loss of fixed conceptual thinking of this sort thus demonstrates the loss of the agent that necessarily must serve as the grounds for the very possibility of such thinking. This process of seeing unity is much like realizing that a map maker must place him or herself on the map that they are creating. When one “illuminates things with Heaven’s light,” one ceases the futile attempt to employ bounded subjectivity and rational thinking to follow that which will always escape fixed conceptualization and instead seeks situated

unity, and employs the mind as a mirror, thereby dissolving the distinction between the observer and the observed, the subject and the object.

### References

- Cook, Scott. Editor. *Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.
- Graham, A.C., trans. *Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters*. 1981. Reprint, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001.
- Hansen, Chad. "Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the *Zhuangzi*." In *Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi*, edited by Scott Cook, 128-162. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.
- Kjellberg, Paul, trans. "Zhuangzi." In *Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy*, 2nd ed., edited by Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden, 207-253. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2005.
- Roth, Harold D. "Bimodal Mystical Experience in the 'Qiwulun' Chapter of the *Zhuangzi*." In *Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi*, edited by Scott Cook, 15-32. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness. 1921. Reprint, London: Routledge, 2006.
- Ziporyn, Brook, trans. *Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional Commentaries*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009.

---

<sup>1</sup> Following the traditional interpretative stance, I will employ the conception of a cohesive first seven chapters referred to as the "Inner Chapters." I will refer to those chapters numbered eight through twenty-two as the "Outer Chapters" and those numbered twenty-three through thirty as the "Miscellaneous Chapters." Both the "Outer" and "Miscellaneous Chapters" are of less clear origin and authorship than the "Inner Chapters." It is notable that Ziporyn, in footnote 3 of the Introduction to his translation *Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings*, makes clear that he accepts these divisions "as developed in Liu Xiaogan's work, not for literary or philosophical reasons" but rather "for textual and philological reasons." Ziporyn is thus clear that he does not employ these issues of authorship or origin in any attempt to extract a higher degree of textual coherence, but instead finds credence in their historical veracity.

<sup>2</sup> In spite of the above issues regarding authorship, I will, with the aim of avoiding both tedium and redundancy, refer to "Zhuangzi" the person as the author of those texts attributed to him, including the so called "Inner," "Outer," and "Miscellaneous Chapters."

<sup>3</sup> Zhuangzi, *Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings with Selections from Traditional Commentaries*, trans. Brook Ziporyn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2009), xvii.

---

<sup>4</sup> Harold D. Roth, “Bimodal Mystical Experience in the ‘Qiwulun’ Chapter of the *Zhuangzi*,” in *Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi*, ed. Scott Cook, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 15.

<sup>5</sup> The question is thus raised as to whether the “individual” as so minimally constituted by Zhuangzi would have flexibility in the way in which he or she encounters the world or simply no framework at all. Although the length of this paper precludes me from further exploring this topic, I also detect a potential third alternative: a framework so flexible and so minimally constituted upon any concept of “self” that the modes through which this “self” encounters the exigencies of the world can not be thought of as either a framework or non-framework as both of these distinctions are predicated upon too strong a concept of “the self.”

<sup>6</sup> Ziporyn, *Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings*, 11.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 13.

<sup>8</sup> Paul Kjellberg, trans., “Zhuangzi” in *Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy*, 2nd edition, ed. Philip J. Ivanhoe and Bryan W. Van Norden (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2005), 218.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 217.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 223.

<sup>11</sup> Chad Hansen, “Guru or Skeptic? Relativistic Skepticism in the *Zhuangzi*,” in *Hiding the World in the World: Uneven Discourses on the Zhuangzi*, ed. Scott Cook (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003), 128.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 129.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 129.

<sup>14</sup> Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, ed. D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London: Routledge, 2006], 89.

<sup>15</sup> Kjellberg, “Zhuangzi,” 250.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 241.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 217.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 243.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 209.

<sup>20</sup> Ziporyn, *Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings*, 4.

<sup>21</sup> Kjellberg, “Zhuangzi,” 214.

<sup>22</sup> Ziporyn, *Zhuangzi: The Essential Writings*, 10.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 15.

<sup>24</sup> A.C. Graham, trans., *Chuang-Tzu: The Inner Chapters* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001), 51.