

Intersubjectivity and Language

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The presentation and subsequent publication of *Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vorträge* in Paris in February 1929 mark Edmund Husserl's major public turn towards the problem of Intersubjectivity, a problem or set of problems that had been occupying him for over a decade. The problem of Intersubjectivity takes on a major role in Husserl's phenomenological research in a number of ways. This includes an issue relevant to phenomenological methodology, and specifically the question of describing phenomenological findings to others. To be able to validate this understanding intersubjectively, following Husserl's standards of evidence, one needs a way to communicate these ideas to others. When using a certain mode of linguistic expression to communicate these ideas the problem arises of how one is able to fully represent subjective experience to others through language. Though not the main focus of Intersubjectivity, the problem of expressing the "felt"¹ differences in subjective experience and expressing them fully² through language takes on a crucial role in phenomenology. The question to be explored in this paper is what method of expression (what levels of description) can one possibly use to get at this aspect of subjective experience and allow others access to it?

A myriad of solutions have been proposed for the problem of language in Intersubjectivity starting from Husserl's focus on the other, to Gadamer and Hermeneutics, and all the way to Derrida and deconstructionism. Though each of these

¹Eduard Marbach, *Mental Representation and Consciousness* (London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1993), 8.

²Fully in the sense of offering a full description of the experience, one which may provide others with a total account of that certain subjective experience.

approaches differ greatly from one to another, they all focus on communicating some form of experience to another person without questioning how one is able to accurately express subjective experience through ordinary language in the first place. These solutions put the cart before the horse. Many philosophers who have written on phenomenology seem to have assumed a commonly understood level of description is enough to reveal subjective experience, though it's easy to see why there are many difficulties with this assumption. Subjective experience, being a largely private thing, would be almost impossible to accurately understand and study if it is solely expressed in the same level of description and perspective that objective information is expressed. Anyone would be hard pressed to agree that something intrinsically private could be expressed accurately in a mostly public and informal method of language.

The focus of this paper is to try and shift the question of language in Intersubjectivity away from something that is considered public and available to everyone and to look for a method which covers all levels of description (public, phenomenologically reduced, etc.) to offer accurate descriptions of subjective experience. In an effort to find such a method we will take a look at three differing viewpoints offered respectively by Daniel Dennett, Eduard Marbach, and Harry Reeder. Dennett's Heterophenomenological method works off the basis that common language use in the form of questions and answers between a subject and a researcher would be enough to get at the kind of "felt" subjective experience at stake here. One needs not bother with trying to access or understand private meaning, but simply continue to question the subject in an array of ways to come to a full description of their subjective experience concerning this or that state of affairs.

Marbach takes a completely different approach, making a methodological choice more in the vein of Frege than contemporary empirical science. The idea of using a formalized symbol system to “provide precise expressions for the *varieties of Intentionality*” is the main purpose of Marbach’s method of dealing with language.³ Harry Reeder’s method takes an approach different from both Dennett and Marbach. The idea of using a fully descriptive mode of language to express meaning in phenomenology, and thus describing subjective experience accurately or more completely, is the purpose of Reeder’s method. Reeder goes about this by covering the private, public, and phenomenologically-reduced levels of description through a combination of both Husserl and Wittgenstein’s views of language.

Daniel Dennett’s view of phenomenology takes a drastically different approach than Husserl’s own method. Opposed to suspending ontology and trying to reach a pure form of consciousness, Dennett takes a more scientific approach in the sense that he rejects the idea of first person discourse as a certain way to come to universal conclusions on consciousness. The important difference that must be recognized before continuing onto the linguistic side is the change in perspective that Heterophenomenology brings about. Dennett likens Husserl’s method to Descartes in the sense that a major characteristic shared between the two is the first person perspective in investigation. Dennett notes that the problem with this method is that it assumes that we are all experiencing the same thing in the exact same way. As Dennett suggests, “Perhaps we are fooling ourselves about the extent to which we are all basically alike.”⁴

The critique Dennett is leveling against the perspective Husserl’s phenomenology can be stated as such: it is impossible for us to describe these universal concepts of

³ Marbach, 23.

⁴ Daniel Dennett, *Consciousness Explained* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991), 67.

consciousness because in so doing we are using a method of introspection that is never simply a matter of looking and seeing. Dennett thinks it is the case that when one is doing this kind of first person introspection one isn't simply describing and observing consciousness, "we are always actually engaging in a sort of impromptu theorizing."⁵ If this is so, the entire descriptive method Husserl proposes would have to be re-thought as it would be impossible to offer up descriptions of what appears to consciousness without adding theory-laden edges to our descriptions.⁶

Amidst this critique of Husserl and the first person method in phenomenology Dennett develops his own third person perspective in his Heterophenomenology. Heterophenomenology proposes a "neutral way of describing the data"⁷ which may be obtained by speaking to individuals about conscious subjective experience. Dennett also expresses doubt concerning the possibilities of linguistic expression's ability to capture the subjective side of experience by simply talking to another person. Dennett does go on to suggest that we take these descriptions of subjective experience and interpret them the same way we interpret texts.⁸ Dennett likens the process to stenographers typing up transcripts of recordings.

If we are to cultivate a method similar to the scientific method (in at least spirit and operation) from Dennett's viewpoint, the key factor in method is neutrality. This neutral practice and its way of describing language is best described by Dennett himself: "The Heterophenomenological method neither challenges nor accepts as entirely true the assertions of subjects, but rather maintains a constructive and sympathetic neutrality, in

⁵ Dennett, 67.

⁶ Dennett's objection concerning Husserl is reminiscent of the problems brought about by the Hermeneutical objection.

⁷ Dennett, 71.

⁸ Dennett, 74-75.

the hopes of compiling a definitive description of the world according to the subjects.”⁹

The problem with the third-person descriptive method that Dennett proposes is that it seems to miss the issue at the heart of the matter. We can admit that by putting together a descriptive analysis of the different aspects of experience of a certain phenomena we could come to a conclusion about what position is generally held by the subject. The problem that still exists despite Dennett’s different methodological approach is that we are still no closer to a full understanding of linguistically expressed descriptions of “felt” subjective experience from the subject. We do have a list of what is said, and yes we are able to increase the definiteness of the positions uttered through interpretation (we can be more concrete on what we think the subject is expressing in their descriptions of experience). Yet this brings us no closer to the subjective data for which we search in phenomenology. Essentially Dennett ignores any first person or phenomenologically-reduced semantics and focuses on the public sphere of language, even though he has doubted the accuracy of it originally. To ignore these other levels of description and their possible influences on meaning for the subject one comes no closer to an understanding of subjective experience – as such things as personal perspective are exactly the kinds of shifts that make subjective experience subjective!

Dennett does offer up interpretation as a possible way to get closer to what is being expressed from the individual’s description of subjective experience. Interpreting Heterophenomenological descriptions would offer a way to cover perspective linguistic shifts, such as personal twists on the meanings of certain words. This method seems to be just as guilty of impromptu theorizing as Dennett’s indictment of Husserl’s first person method. It is safe to assume that any kind of interpretation would be full of assumptions and past theories concerning what this or that possibly means in context. If

⁹ Dennett, 83.

we are to consider this kind of theorizing as holding a negative impact on description then we must also reject Dennett's method of inquiry. Though Dennett does admit that certain aspects do depend upon "assumptions about which language is being spoken and on some of the speaker's intentions,"¹⁰ he seems to find no problem with his own method, while dismissing a first-person methodology for some of the same reasons. It would seem that to assume the speaker's intentions are all similar enough for this to work would be to assume we are all more similar than is the case. This does seem to be a damaging critique of both first-person and Heterophenomenological methods, yet it will become clear later why a more open first-person method is able to survive such a critique.

Without offering some kind of analysis of the subjective aspects one only comes out with a nice general description, but misses the original goal of the inquiry in the first place. If this is so then Dennett's Heterophenomenology brings us no closer to a clarification of the expression of subjective experience from the actual experience to the individual's speech-act in language. What we are left with is the same public sphere of language that we are familiar with in everyday conversations.

Marbach's method approaches the problem of language in Intersubjectivity from a more analytic perspective. In the same sense of Frege's formal symbol system of mathematics and logic,¹¹ Marbach wishes to create a phenomenological notation to more accurately express "*varieties of Intentionality*."¹² As Eduard Marbach states his purpose in formalizing a usually descriptive language: "In the hope of improving the fundamentally descriptive language of phenomenology as an intersubjectively, publicly, available tool for designating and communicating something essentially subjective."¹³

¹⁰ Dennett, 75.

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¹² Marbach, 23.

¹³ Marbach 24.

Though Marbach sees his method as one being available to all, he states that “the phenomenological notation is meant to *improve the reflectively-oriented theoretical language of phenomenology*, and not our ordinary ways of talking about the mental.”¹⁴

While Marbach’s method makes no clear distinctions between reduced or public language, by creating a notation system that can be reduced to the phenomenological descriptions of intentionality one can assume his emphasis would rest in the same levels of description that the notations take their representation from. If we have come to an understanding of Marbach’s intentions for his method, we must show examples of it to come to a full understanding of his approach to the question at hand.

The phenomenological reduction will later be discussed in more detail, yet it is necessary to give a brief explanation of why this is another level of description in regards to Marbach. In his first person method, Husserl takes a turn to suspend the metaphysics and ontology of the world that are associated with that which appear to the individual's consciousness. The reasoning for this method within Husserl’s phenomenology is significant to discuss because the question becomes, “Once one suspends metaphysics and ontology, is one simply looking and describing everything from a different perspective in semantics?” To differentiate between the public use of the word “chair” and the phenomenologically-reduced word “chair” completely shifts the meaning behind it. Now one is no longer worried about the object's specific existence or place in reality. Though significant in Husserl’s phenomenology, we can see the reduction as being another level of description or shift in perspective when it comes to how language operates in the varying conditions of our experience.

Marbach’s method uses a number of notations and abbreviations to represent various things in the phenomenological world. Abbreviations such as REM or PRE stand

¹⁴ Marbach, 24.

for remember or perceive; in short they represent mental activities of various kinds. Lower case letters, such as x or y, are used to represent the intentional object in question. Both sets of symbols, depending on context, can be used to represent these activities or objects either in general or specific instances. Marbach also uses the symbols () to group together the act of intention as well as the object, relating back the idea of having to be “conscious of something.”¹⁵ Using Marbach’s notation from the vocabulary developed above we can create examples of his proposed method of phenomenological notation in action.

If one wishes to talk about imagining an object, say an apple, one could formalize this statement and represent it in Marbach’s system as: IMG x. A number of other symbols are used to represent various concepts in phenomenology such as past time, future time, intentional implication of mental activity, belief, and so on. We need not continue with a full explanation of his method through an analysis of each notation, rather let us instead examine his end goal and see if his method is able to clear away some of the confusion between language and phenomenology. Could Marbach’s formal method be enough to solve our problems with language?

It seems not. Two points of contention rally hard against the possibility of a formal notation system’s ability to express subjectivity well. First, starting from a formalized “objective” public language representation and trying to express subjective experience through it is like trying to fit a square through a round hole. Though, in a general sense, Marbach’s method is able to formalize general descriptions in phenomenology (such as “I imagine a bee”), it begins having problems when it has to help express something a bit more subjective. When trying to describe the feeling or qualia of experience itself from the subject’s perspective Marbach’s method would fail

¹⁵ Marbach, 24-26.

simply on the fact that it is formalized and objective. The notation system as a whole is not able to be flexible enough to reach deep enough into subjectivity and accurately, or even closely, express these experiences. If one ever encounters a situation that might stretch itself outside of the formal system one would be at a loss to represent such a finding in Marbach's notation.

The second point of contention arises from the idea of the notation system itself and involves a more technical point. It would seem only to further complicate attempts to express subjective experience, to take a step into abstraction by formalization. The purpose behind a *descriptive* language in phenomenology is to provide a full disclosure of all things, while formalizing such language could only stand to leave oddities or unexpected results without a form of expression. On top of that, the idea of then having to relate the symbols to their regular descriptive language only begs for problems. Arguments over inaccurate translations of notations or misunderstandings concerning the use of symbol x or y offer only more possible complications. Though Marbach's theory does not interfere with phenomenological description in the sense that Dennett's method does, it is still problematic as a way to express the "felt" subjective experience of consciousness.

Harry Reeder's approach to our problem hits the source of the troubling issues directly as his method confronts the problems that arise at the public and personal first-person levels of description in the phenomenological description of subjective experience. Reeder's approach is to cover the phenomenologically-reduced area of language according to Husserl's concept of language as well as other mental structures that may factor into language, while combining Wittgenstein's later linguistic method. This combined method, in theory, is able to express the extremely public as well as

personal aspects of language concerning experience without disregarding the change that occurs in meaning due to the phenomenological reduction. In short, Reeder is able to provide a descriptive method that covers more changes in meaning and perspective than previously discussed methods. Before we can come to the synthesis of Husserl and Wittgenstein's positions we must first analyze them alone to show the compatible points at which Reeder is able to combine the two methods.

Reeder focuses, for the most part, on Wittgenstein's later philosophy concerning language. The idea that meaning is designated by how the words are used is one that dominates Wittgenstein's later philosophy. Though opposed to his earlier pictorial theory of meaning, Wittgenstein's later method also encompasses the importance of context (as Husserl acknowledges, as we will see later) through his focus on the importance of language-games. The main idea one needs to come away with concerning Wittgenstein's views on language is that one can hold an understanding of the meaning of a word in the public sense through its use and context, and yet still hold that the experience restricted to the mental realm plays a significant part in language.

Though most philosophers tend to lean towards the idea that Wittgenstein was arguing for a mostly, if not completely, public language, Reeder considers a different approach. Reeder considers there to be a slight opening in Wittgenstein's later philosophy for private language, "By stressing the public elements of language, Wittgenstein laid the ground for showing the intricate system of mutual causation – of give and take – which exists between the public and the private in experience."¹⁶ How does Reeder come about the conclusion that we can have room for private language in Wittgenstein's philosophy?

¹⁶Harry Reeder, *Language and Experience: Descriptions of Living Language in Husserl and Wittgenstein* (Washington DC: University Press of America, 1984), 42.

Reeder considers Wittgenstein a weak linguistic behaviorist, one that believes in the dominance of public language yet still sees a role for private thought to play because Reeder is able to find passages “in which he allows mental activity to play some part in language-use.”¹⁷ Cited passages from the *Blue and Brown Books* (amongst other texts by Wittgenstein) serve to clear up the assumption proposed by Reeder. Statements such as “Mental images of colors, shapes, sounds, etc., etc., which play a role in communication by means of language,”¹⁸ back up Reeder’s claim to conceptualize Wittgenstein’s linguistic theory as accounting for meaning in both the public and private (mental) realms of thought and action. This also points to the theory (though not a focus of Reeder) of Wittgenstein’s earlier philosophy concerning the pictorial theory of meaning,¹⁹ one which some (including Reeder) believe Wittgenstein never fully disregarded. For our purposes, whether or not Wittgenstein himself would agree with the assessment is beside the point. We can accept it as a possible interpretation of Wittgenstein’s theory of language.

Reeder describes Husserl’s conception of the use of language as consisting of occurrences “at the interface of public, private, and transcendental elements of experience.”²⁰ While describing a theory of language that encompasses all three levels of description is a rather large task, Reeder is able to provide us with a rather complete picture from Husserl’s writings. To understand how expression and meaning can be found in Husserl one must first come to an understanding of the phenomenological and eidetic reductions. These three levels of description are tied together when Husserl’s aim to describe the subjective flow of experience to uncover the objective and transcendental epistemological grounds of meaning is realized.

¹⁷ Reeder, 43.

¹⁸ Reeder, 43.

¹⁹ This is a similar view supported by other Contemporary philosophers, such as Jaakko Hintikka.

²⁰ Reeder, 118.

To return to Marbach's briefly-described methodology, the phenomenological reduction provides us with access to reduced consciousness and the eidetic reduction as a way to describe subjective, first-person experience, as well as the disclosing of transcendental structures. The phenomenological reduction occurs in two different steps: called, accordingly, the phenomenological reduction and the eidetic reduction.²¹ The first reduction provides one with the suspension of, “all transcendent (spatial and worldly) reference to things outside of their appearance in the phenomena.” By proceeding through the first reduction one is able, according to Husserl, to access the level of non-metaphysical experience.²² By the suspension, not elimination, of such metaphysical commitments on language and experience one is able to deal strictly with what appears to consciousness and thus analyze the general structures of experience.

The second step of the phenomenological reduction is the eidetic reduction. Through the second reduction one is able to move from the individual, first-person perspective of phenomena to a larger view of experience that reveals the general structures of experience. While the first step allows one to suspend metaphysical commitments, the eidetic reduction allows one to uncover the transcendental structures of experience held within phenomenologically-reduced consciousness. The eidetic reduction also gives birth to Husserl's concept of free variation, a method within the second reduction that allows one, through imagination (or some form of mental manipulation), to establish these general structures.²³

A distinction between two epistemological foundations must first be made as a way of providing an epistemological basis for knowing an expressive or speech act. The *de facto* foundation of knowledge provides one with how things appear *a posteriori*.

²¹ Reeder, 83.

²² Reeder, 83-84.

²³ Reeder, 83 and 87.

Husserl finds such foundations in the phenomenological reduction without their ontological reference or metaphysical commitments. Once one pulls him or herself out of the flow of experience one is able to analyze such things through Husserl's method. The a priori, de jure foundation of knowledge provides one with the "legitimizing structures of possible experience" found through the eidetic reduction.²⁴ But why are these foundations of knowledge a major factor concerning language? Reeder, like Husserl, considers the de jure and de facto foundations a necessary reference for *parole*, which justifies the statements concerning the meeting-grounds of meaning – between the public (de facto), first-person and private (de jure), and transcendental levels of description. All three areas contribute to meaning within Husserl's phenomenology.

Now that the methods and epistemological foundations for expression (amongst other things) of Husserl are covered by Reeder one is able to move onto how meaning is held in language within Husserl's phenomenology. We can approach the subject matter by dividing it into two different areas: the public realm of language, and the private realm. In so doing we may locate where phenomenological analysis takes over one's investigation facilitating for us a view of "essential features of expressions."²⁵

The public realm, the intersubjectively verifiable realm, of language doesn't go to the wayside in Husserl's methodology, a commonly misunderstood supposed consequence of the phenomenological reduction. Rather, the problem that does arise concerning the public level of language use becomes, how can one describe phenomenologically-reduced consciousness while using naïve (ordinary) language? Though meaning is changed by the suspension of metaphysical commitments in phenomenologically-reduced consciousness, it doesn't erase the public realm of

²⁴ Reeder, 77-78.

²⁵ Reeder, 106.

language. Husserl is not trying to eliminate the cultural and historical influences one has on one's language. These aspects of language and experience continue to stay the same in Husserl's methodology, the naïve ontological commitment is simply removed from them; thus allowing such aspects of language and experience to be viewed as phenomena under both reductions.²⁶ By viewing such public things as phenomena, one is viewing them, "with or through de facto privately accessed experience."²⁷

For Husserl, the public realm consists of *langue* (traditional and historical use of language), grammar, context, behavior, and words qua physical occurrences (vocal, printed, etc.)²⁸ Here is where one sees the greatest connection between Wittgenstein's predominantly public methodology and Husserl's phenomenology. Both agree on the public features of such structures as grammar, context, and *langue*. In addition to these public structures, Husserl does consider a priori possibilities of meaning (that which must presuppose any actual meaning) which extend to both the public of private realm. To be sure, a number of these events can be considered to be psychological, and thus fall outside the scope of Husserl's investigation.

The expressive private realm of language consists of the meaning-act and meaning-intention sorted into three different terms to show meaning or "what an expression expresses." "Intimation of the sense-giving mental act, the contents (meaning) of such an act, and the objective correlate of the act," are the three different terms we must cover to finish our analysis of Husserl's treatment of language in phenomenology.²⁹ The three terms, though talking about parts of private experience, do bleed into both the public and private realms. Intimation is where Husserl does admit,

²⁶ Reeder, 94-97.

²⁷ Reeder, 97.

²⁸ Reeder, 99.

²⁹ Reeder, 99.

while still rejecting the idea of mental picturing, a correlation between mental states and expressions. For Husserl the connection becomes apparent as expressions serve to alert one to the mental states of another though we have no first-person access to such states of another, thus rendering them private. Intimation, for Husserl, is not the meaning of expressions. This is left to both contents and the objective correlate parts of expressions.

Contents, for Husserl, are that which are related to something objective, “[a]n expression means something in so far as it means something, it relates to what is objective.”³⁰ The objective correlate of that which an expression says something about. Tying the two terms together, content and objective correlate, we come to meaning in Husserl’s phenomenology, “[t]he objective correlate of an expression is what is spoken of, the meaning of an expression is the manner of addressing the objective correlate.”³¹ An easier way to think of the distinctions Husserl holds for meaning is in the same sense as Gottlob Frege’s distinctions of sense of reference. One could see Husserl’s content as Frege’s sense and his objective correlate as Frege’s reference.

Now that the public and private foundations of language and meaning are beginning to be covered we must also address the de jure and de facto foundations of knowledge – the legitimizing structures of experiences – which phenomenological descriptions allow us access to. Even though the above structures do account for meaning under a certain level of description they have yet to reach the depth that Husserl looks for in the phenomenological grounding of such ideas.

In a phenomenologically-grounded investigation, Husserl finds intrinsic meaning in “intentional acts of meaning fulfillment.”³² To come to descriptions of possible meaning in phenomena, one must also offer phenomenological descriptions for the three

³⁰ Reeder, 105.

³¹ Reeder, 106.

³² Reeder, 108.

intentional structures (private, public, and transcendental) existing in language. The private intentional structures need to be analyzed because all intentionally is private, in the sense of it being first-person experience only available to reduced consciousness.³³ The public intentional structures of meaning-intention or meaning-fulfillment are public because of their reliance on conventional grammar, the *langue*, as they are embodied descriptions in *parole*.³⁴ The transcendental intentional structures are shown in the “a priori structures that epistemologically legitimize the various elements of the meaning-intention.”³⁵

By combining Wittgenstein and Husserl’s methods, Reeder is able to provide multiple levels of description concerning meaning in language. On top of the public and private structures of language, Reeder (through Husserl’s methodology) provides one with descriptions of meaning from intentional structures of expressions. Though problems with Reeder’s method are covered below, it would seem the covering of a larger amount of perspectives and associated experiences in language is what shows Reeder’s combined theory as one that covers more bases than the rest.

There are, admittedly, some problems with Reeder’s theory. Primarily that one could say this fuller description may still not be reaching a concrete example of complete expressed meaning in subjective experience. Reeder presents a theory of language that is fuller in the sense that it offers a larger description encompassing a number of different perspective changes in language. The same problem springs up with both Dennett as well as Marbach. Though Reeder does encompass a larger amount of perspectives or areas in language he still leaves a number of them out of his descriptions. This is an accurate critique of the newly combined method, yet it seems to be a minor point when

³³ Reeder, 112.

³⁴ Reeder, 112.

³⁵ Reeder, 113.

looking at Reeder's theory from a large view. It is only a minor point concerning Reeder because the method Reeder offers is one more that covers more levels of description than we previously saw in Dennett, Marbach, Wittgenstein, or Husserl's theories of language alone. By the covering of various shifts in meaning – be it from various perspectives or realms of languages – Reeder's presented method helps points out the necessity of research when trying to get at the accuracy of expression in subjective experience. Though not a perfect method by far, Reeder's combined descriptive (again, a combination of Wittgenstein and Husserl) seems to leave one with a more complete picture than other previous methods have afforded.

In conclusion, it would seem that we still have yet to come to a concrete answer of how to accurately express subjective “felt” experiences in language. Though this still creates a problem for phenomenology, and Husserl, a solution seems to be on the brink of being sketched out. Though Dennett's method of simply questioning the subject in research and compiling a sketch of his or her descriptions, and Marbach's idea of formalizing language concerning phenomenological description both fall short of the mark; Reeder's combined method points in the right direction. The method that can provide us with the most accuracy thus far is the one that can offer us the largest available description when covering how one can understand meaning from language in all realms. Far from perfect, problems do still arise concerning this path of inquiry. One may ask, “How can this method's language be said to be accurate at all, since it still uses this or that mode of language before showing how it can get down to the subjective experience itself?” Another problem may simply be that the gap between experience and language, no matter how much smaller we continue to make it, may never be closed. No

description or method may be full enough in scope to accurately convey the forms of life that prompt one to express things in the first place.

By acknowledging the gap that remains between language and experience do we still end up with the consequences of the heremeutical objection? Yes, but with a small degree of wiggle room. Though we may not be able to completely close the gap, by describing what different perspective-changing moves do to language and meaning, in connection with experience, we are able to get close the gap bit by bit. By including other methods and perspectives of language, such as the phenomenological and eidetic reduction and the role mental activity plays in language, one is able to offer a more conclusive description of experience. We are still left with the hermeneutical objection, but we are left with the ability to make a little more progress in description and thus add a bit more depth to our understanding of the matter.

Though this conclusion may not offer a concrete answer it does convey a sense of where to look when trying to find the ability and understanding to express subjective experience in an accurate way. We have been presented a good scope of methods, ranging from the scientific and analytic, to the more linguistically-guided. The methods that offer to help one close the gap between language and experience are those that continue to cover every aspect of where and how experience is expressed in language, not simply the more public spheres that are more commonly used when commenting on language and expression.

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